Risk Mitigation for Critical Infrastructures: AUEB INFOSEC Lab Initiatives

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January 2017

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Outline

Critical Infrastructures: *The heart of a Nation*

- Need for high-level multi-sectoral risk assessment

Basis: *A Multi-risk dependency analysis methodology*

- Modeling cascading and common-cause failures

Current research: *Extending dependency analysis*

I. Time-based analysis of cascading and common cause failures

II. Risk mitigation strategies based on graph centrality analysis

Conclusions and future work: *The road so far*

Critical Infrastructures: The heart of a nation

- **Critical Infrastructure:** *"An asset or system which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions. The damage to a critical infrastructure, its destruction or disruption by natural disasters, terrorism, criminal activity or malicious behaviour, may have a significant negative impact for the security of the EU and the well-being of its citizens." (Directorate-General of Migration and Home Affairs, the European Commission)*

- Backbone of a nation's economy, security and health.
  - Provide Energy and Transport
  - Support transportation and communication systems
  - Must be protected against all types of hazards along with their services and systems
  - Failures can be cross-border. Particular valid in Europe since many Member States are affected (e.g. blackouts)

Critical Infrastructures: The heart of a nation

- Critical Infrastructures (CIs) : Cyber-physical systems
  - Inherently complex systems
- Interconnected and interdependent with other CIs
  - Different sectors (such as energy, ICT or transportation)
  - Failure in one infrastructure may affect operation of others
- Dependency failures a recent area of research
  - Goal to make key nodes resilient (avoid propagation)



Critical Infrastructures: Multi-sectoral risk assessment

Disruptions in CIs usually categorized as:

- ***Cascading failure***: Disruption in infrastructure A affects >1 components in infrastructure B. Partial or total unavailability of B
- ***Escalating failure***: Disruption in one infrastructure exacerbates independent disruption of another infrastructure
  - Usually by increasing severity or time needed for recovering
- ***Common-cause failure***: Two or more infrastructure networks are disrupted at the same time
  - Components within each network fail because of some common cause
  - Infrastructures usually co-located (geographic interdependency) or if root cause of failure is widespread (e.g. a natural or a man-made disaster)

Basis: A multi-risk dependency analysis methodology

- ***Infrastructure Dependency***: "One-directional reliance of an asset, system, network, or collection thereof – within or across sectors – on an input, interaction, or other requirement from other sources in order to function properly"
- Modeled as directional graphs:
  - *Nodes* depict infrastructures or components
  - *Edges* depict infrastructure dependencies
- Estimations quantify the ***impact*** and ***likelihood*** of a disruption realized
  - Impact ($I_{i,j}$) and Likelihood ($L_{i,j}$) of edge connecting *i* to *j*

Critical Infrastructures: Multi-sectoral risk assessment



Research Initiatives: Extending dependency analysis

A. Time-based analysis of cascading and common cause failures (CIDA tool)

B. Risk mitigation strategies based on graph centrality analysis

Current research: Time-based analysis of failures

Critical Infrastructure Dependency Analysis (CIDA) tool

- Neo4J graph database
- Developed using Java
- Accepts risk assessment input
- Supports 17 different CI sectors, including communications, energy, transportation
- Computes risk for each individual dependency path



Current research: Time-based analysis of failures

- Calculates edge (dependency) impact for each time slot
  - Gives estimate of impact progression from failures
- Values T and G provided by risk assessors
- Supports ***Slow***, ***Linear*** or ***Fast*** evolution of consequences after failure



Current research: Time-based analysis of failures

- Preemptive analysis detects dangerous risk paths
  - **Pinpoints most critical paths** for each time-frame of events
  - **Most critical path in each time slot** after a cascading failure. Methodology models impact growth rates and time periods (path A-E-F-G).



CIDA OUTPUT

Example Analysis:

- Although (A-B-C-D) is highest risk path, sub-path (A-E-F-G) exhibits impact higher than threshold within 12 hours.
- **Necessary to implement mitigation controls at the first or second order of A-F-E-G if we can react faster than 12h**.



Current research: Risk mitigation using graph centrality

- Dependency chain analysis is not by itself sufficient for developing an efficient risk mitigation strategy
- We explore graph centrality metrics to design and evaluate effective risk mitigation strategies
  - ***Degree***, ***Closeness***, ***Betweenness***, ***Eccentricity*** and ***Eigenvector*** graph centrality metrics used
- Experiments based on random graphs that simulate CI dependency characteristics

C.I. Centrality Method

1. Assess the cumulative dependency risk of all existing dependency paths in a given dependency risk graph.
2. Compute all centrality measures for every node.
3. Examine alternative mitigation strategies:
    - Define strategy: select a subset of nodes for applying risk mitigation controls, based on centrality measures.
    - Apply the strategy to the selected subset of nodes, i.e. reduce the weights of all the outgoing edges for each node in the selected set.
    - Generate new (reduced) risk graph.
    - Evaluate the results of the strategy by comparing the new graph to the initial one (risk of the most critical path, max risk of all paths, or no. of paths with high risk).

Current research: *Risk mitigation using graph centrality*

- Feature selection used to ***detect correlations*** between high centrality metrics and CI nodes
- Metrics help ***detect dangerous CI nodes*** in dependency graphs
- Tests on 32,950 nodes extracted from 700 graphs with 774,015,270 paths

INFORMATION GAIN	Inbound Test	Outbound Test
Betweeness	0.259	0.277
Eccentricity	0.238	0.285
Closeness	0.387	0.345
Eigenvector	0.151	0.260
Intersection of all Centralities	0.176	0.248
Inbound degree (sinkholes)	-	0.302
Outbound degree	0.281	-

Table 1: Weka's output ranking using the Information Gain algorithm

GAIN RATIO	Inbound Test	Outbound Test
Betweeness	0.08	0.101
Eccentricity	0.08	0.101
Closeness	0.14	0.120
Eigenvector	0.06	0.09
Intersection of all Centralities	0.458	0.550
Inbound degree (sinkholes)	-	0.103
Outbound degree	0.101	-

Table 2: Weka's output ranking using the Gain Ratio algorithm

Current research: *Risk mitigation using graph centrality*

- Proposed ***algorithm*** for efficient risk mitigation strategy
- Algorithm ***selects best subset of CI nodes*** for risk mitigation
- Evaluated on 2000 random experiments
- Compared with two other mitigation strategies

Strategies / *Risk Metrics*	Information Gain	Top Initiators	Top Sinkholes
Most critical path	43.7% (max) 12.1% (avg)	38.4% (max) 11.8% (avg)	34.5% (max) 10.3% (avg)
Top 20 critical paths	37.5% (max) 9.8% (avg)	28.7% (max) 10.0% (avg)	29.8% (max) 7.3% (avg)
Entire graph	12.2% (max) 7.5% (avg)	10.1% (max) 5.3% (avg)	10.8% (max) 6.7% (avg)

Table 3: Comparison of results from all mitigation strategies



Conclusions and future work: The road so far

- Both initiatives complement each other
- Each one helps solve a different problem:
  1. Need for time-based analysis of impact evolution in failures
  2. Need to detect dangerous CI nodes that greatly affect the dependencies of interconnected infrastructures
- Test results from both initiatives look promising when evaluated on real-world scenarios

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